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I. INTRODUCTION AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The evolution of the admiralty wrongful death doctrine and its associated
recovery scheme can be described as complicated at best and tortured at
worst. The Supreme Court has rarely spoken to the issue, leaving to lower
federal courts the arduous task of deciphering and applying the few cryptic
and at times contradictory cases handed down by the Court. Although
scholars and jurists believed the rule to be settled that state law had no place
in admiralty wrongful death suits, the Court has surprised both by reversing
itself and setting forth a new rule.
The last in a trilogy of Supreme Court Cases, Yamaha Motor Corporation,
U.S.A. v. Calhoun' has apparently brought to a close the debate concerning
the availability of state remedies for wrongful death claims arising under
maritime law. Beginning with the case of The Harrisburg2 and continuing
with Moragne v. State Marine Lines3 nearly a century later, the Supreme
Court has been plagued by the question of what remedial scheme to apply
to those seeking redress in admiralty for a wrongful death. Seeking to
achieve clarity and equity, the Supreme Court has finally, it seems, set forth
a definitive rule concerning recovery for wrongful deaths occurring in state
territorial waters.4
* M.A., J.D. 1997. The author wishes to thank Professor Thomas J. Schoenbaum and
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' Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619, 133 L.Ed.2d 578, 1996
A.M.C. 305, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 463 (Jan. 9, 1996).
2 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
4 Territorial waters are defined as "all inland waters, all waters between [the] line of mean
high tide and [the] line of ordinary low water, and all waters seaward to a line three
geographical miles distant from the coast line." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1473 (6th ed.
1990).
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In The Harrisburg, the Supreme Court held that general maritime law, the
judge-made federal common law prevalent in admiralty, did not afford a
cause of action for wrongful death because such actions are statutory in
nature and cannot be created by the judiciary in an ad-hoc fashion. 5 In
reaching this decision, the Court noted that United States and English
common law did not allow recovery for "an injury which results in death."6
In the aftermath of The Harrisburg, federal courts began granting recovery
under state wrongful death statutes instead of under a federal maritime
common law.7 Indeed, the Court subsequently held that recognizing
wrongful death and survival causes of action under state remedial schemes
was consistent with substantive maritime policies.8
Congress also passed legislation creating additional bases for wrongful
death actions. Passed in 1920, the Jones Act provides a wrongful death
cause of action for survivors of seamen killed during their employment,9
while the Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), also passed in 1920,
provides for a federal cause of action for wrongful death occurring more than
three nautical miles'0 from the shore of any state or territory."
Certain subsequent cases and statutory enactments, however, complicated
the matter. The doctrine of unseaworthiness, previously recognized as a
means for a seaman to recover for injuries sustained as a result of the
negligence of the shipowner, was expanded. In Mahnich v. Southern S.S.
Co., the Court transformed the federal maritime common law cause of action
into a sort of strict liability under which the shipowner was liable for injury
resulting from a failure to supply a safe ship, regardless of fault or crew
negligence.' 2 The absolute duty of seaworthiness was extended to longshore
5 The Harrisburg 119 U.S. at 213, 214.
6 Id. at 204.
7 See The City of Norwalk, 55 F. 98 (S.D.N.Y 1893); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257
U.S. 233 (1921) (widow of maritime worker killed in California's territorial waters can
recover under that state's wrongful death statute).
s See Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. at 242; Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S. 383
(1941) (recognizing state survival statutes in cases arising out of accidents in territorial
waters).
9 Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688 (West 1995). Recovery for Injury to or Death of Seamen
(Jones Act), 46 USC § 688 (West 1994).
10he nautical mile contains 6,080 feet, as opposed to the ordinary or statute mile, which
contains 5,280 feet. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 992 (6th ed. 1990).
" Death on High Seas By Wrongful Act (DOHSA), 46 U.S.C.A § 767 (1995).
12 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).
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workers in Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, creating a large class of litigants
known as "Sieracki seamen."' 3
The recognition of this strict duty to provide a seaworthy vessel created
anomalies in recoveries for wrongful death, as unseaworthiness causes of
action were based on strict liability while state wrongful death statutes were
negligence based. The Court was faced with this disparity in the landmark
Moragne decision.
In Moragne, the Court attempted to remedy the uncertainty over the role
state law played in remedying deaths in territorial waters and anomalies
which had arisen since the Court's decision in The Harrisburg.14 The Court
identified three anomalies. First, if the violation of federal law were based
on unseaworthiness, an injury would give rise to a cause of action under
federal maritime law, while recovery for wrongful death would be governed
by state statutes, which often did not have seaworthiness as a basis of
liability. 5  Such was the case in Moragne, where the widow of a
longshore worker killed in Florida's territorial waters saw her suit dismissed
by the District Court because Florida's wrongful death statute did not
encompass unseaworthiness as a basis of liability.1 6  If, however, her
husband had only been injured by an unseaworthy condition, his recovery
under the LHWCA would be premised on strict liability for unseaworthiness.
Therefore, the worker would have had a remedy had he survived, but,
because he did not, his widow was left without a cause of action.
Second, if death occurred outside the three nautical mile limit imposed by
DOHSA, unseaworthiness was available as a basis of liability. If death
occurred within the three mile limit, state law governed, and the survivors
might not be able to premise a cause of action on unseaworthiness. 7
Finally, at the time Moragne was decided, survivors of seamen were denied
a cause of action for wrongful death premised on unseaworthiness if the
seaman died in territorial waters because the Jones Act provides only a
negligence-based claim. Longshore workers, however, were permitted such
a recovery before the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA which eliminated
'3 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). 1972 amendments to the Longshore
and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA) limited recovery to negligence based
claims. See generally Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901
et seq. (1994).
'4 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 395.
I Id.
16 Id. at 376-377.
17 Id. at 395.
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longshore workers' cause of action for seaworthiness and replaced it with a
negligence standard (thereby eliminating the Sieracki worker), despite the
fact that seaworthiness had been extended to the longshore worker only
because the nature of his work often closely resembled that of a seaman.
The Court in Moragne therefore created a cause of action for wrongful
death to ensure that seamen and their survivors would be treated alike. It
overruled The Harrisburg and held that "an action does lie under maritime
law for death caused by violation of maritime duties." 19 Although the issue
appeared settled, Yamaha brought forth a question that remained unanswered
after Moragne: did the "Moragne cause of action" displace state remedies
previously available to supplement general maritime law?
Twelve year old Natalie Calhoun was killed in a jet ski accident while she
and her family were vacationing in Puerto Rico. While riding a "WaveJam-
mer" jet ski, Natalie slammed into a vessel anchored in the waters near the
hotel and was killed. The Calhouns brought suit against Yamaha, the
manufacturer of the jet ski, in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania.20 Jurisdiction was grounded on diversity of
citizenship and admiralty and the Calhouns sought recovery under Pennsylva-
nia's wrongful death and survival law.2'
The Calhouns premised their claim on negligence, strict liability, and
breach of implied warranty, and sought damages for loss of support and
services, lost future earnings, loss of society, funeral expenses and punitive
damages.22 Yamaha argued in a motion for partial summary judgment that
the federal maritime wrongful death action recognized in Moragne was the
sole basis for recovery, and as such, the Calhouns could only recover funeral
expenses.23
The District Court granted Yamaha's motion for partial summary
judgment, and found that the maritime death action created in Moragne did
displace state remedies but that loss of society and loss of support and
services were compensable under that death action.24 Both parties made
requests to the District Court to present certain questions to the Third Circuit
Is Yamaha, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 463, at 28.
'9 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
20 Yamaha, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 463, at 7.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 7, 8.
23 Id. at 8.
24 Id. at 8, 9.
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pursuant to an immediate interlocutory appeal.25 A panel of the Third
Circuit did not reach the questions it was presented but addressed the
anterior issue of which remedial scheme applied. It ruled that state law
remedies would apply in this case:
We have concluded that whether loss of society, loss of
support and services, future earning, or punitive damages are
available for the death of non-seamen in territorial waters is
a question to be decided in accordance with state law.
26
The court remanded the case to the trial court to decide whether Puerto
Rican or Pennsylvania law applied. Subsequent to the decision, the
Calhoun's attorney accurately forecasted the intervention of the Supreme
Court to harmonize the split in the circuits after the ruling, citing a Fourth
Circuit case which had foreclosed state remedies under almost identical
facts. 2
7
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the following question:
"[d]oes the federal maritime claim for wrongful death recognized in Moragne
supply the exclusive remedy in cases involving the death of nonseafarers
28
in territorial waters? 2
9
In an opinion written by Justice Ginsburg, a unanimous Court held that the
principles expressed in Moragne, that of the extension of relief rather that the
contraction of remedies, would best be served if the application of state
statutes to deaths within territorial waters were preserved."0 The Court
recounted the jurisprudential history of the wrongful death issue, discussing
The Harrisburg and Moragne cases and the impetus behind those deci-
25 Id. at 9.
2 Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp. USA, 40 F.3d 622 at 644 (3d Cir. 1994).
27 Brian Harris, State Law Applies in Jet Ski Suit; Maritime Law Not an Issue, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Nov. 8 1994, at 1. The Calhoun's attorney was referring to Wahlstrom v.
Kawasaki Heavy Indus., Ltd., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993), in which the family of a young
man killed when his jet ski collided with a vessel was denied relief based on the supremacy
of federal maritime law over state wrongful death statutes.
2 The term "nonseafarers" was taken by the Court to mean persons not covered by the
Jones Act or by the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. Yamaha, 1996 U.S.
LEXIS 463, at 13. I have used the term in this same context throughout this article.
'9Id. at 12, 13.
30 Id. at 28.
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sions a  The Court reiterated its belief that The Harrisburg was wrongly
decided and that its creation, in Moragne, of a federal maritime cause of
action for wrongful death providing for access by seafarers to the unseawor-
thiness doctrine, was based on a desire to expand the remedies available to
survivors of those killed in territorial waters.32 Although Congress has
prescribed a well-defined regime for recovery by survivors of seafarers (i.e.,
the Jones Act and LHWCA), it has not prescribed remedies for the wrongful
deaths of nonseafarers in territorial waters.33 Congress even explicitly
provided that the DOHSA does not displace state law in territorial waters.'
The Court therefore reasoned that legislative intent would be more closely
served by preserving the application of state statutes to deaths within
territorial waters where the victims are not persons covered by legislation
providing a uniformly applied and comprehensive tort recovery regime.35
The Court concluded that the damages available for Natalie Calhoun's jet ski
death were governed by state law.36
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
At early common law, no recovery could be had for wrongful death as the
common law held that death extinguished a cause of action.37 In the ancient
Sea Codes dating back to the Eighth Century, for example, the survivors of
a deceased seaman could only recover the payment of wages and the return
of the seaman's effects. a The nineteenth century, however, saw a gradual
diverging of admiralty and common-law, the result being the cognizance of
an admiralty cause of action for the survivor of the decedent.3 9 Locality
became a determinative factor in the outcome of these tort cases.40 In the
E.B. Ward, Jr.,41 for example, survival damages were rejected by the District
3' Id. at 14, 19.
32 Id. at 28.
" Id. at 31.
34 Id.
35 id.
36Id. at 32.
37 George W. Healy, III, Remedies for Maritime Personal Injury and Wrongful Death in
American Law: Sources and Development, 68 TUL. L. REV. 311, 355 (1994).
Id. at 355 n.313.
39 See, The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas 909 (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
o Healy, supra note 37, at 356.
41 The E.B. Ward, Jr., 16 F. 255 (C.C.E.D. La. 1883).
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Court of Louisiana because the death occurred on the high seas, as opposed
to The Sea Gull, where death occurred in state territorial waters.42
Shortly after that pivotal case, the Supreme Court decided The Harrisburg,
which held that, in the absence of a statute giving the right, "no such action
[to recover damages for the death of a human being on the high seas, or
waters navigable from the sea, caused by negligence,] will lie in the courts
of the United States under the general maritime law."43 While shutting the
doors to a recovery based on the general maritime law, the Court did not bar
the application of state law tort remedies. In order to mitigate the harshness
of the Court's decision, lower federal courts began to apply state wrongful
death statutes to deaths occurring on the high seas in cases where defendants
were from the same state and the state statute explicitly applied to deaths on
the high seas." Apparently striving to obtain uniformity in the rules
regarding wrongful death claims on the high seas, Congress took steps to
codify wrongful death remedies in 1920.
The Death on the High Seas Act (DOHSA), enacted in 1920, provides a
cause of action for the death of any person "caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore
of any State ... or the Territories or dependencies of the United States.
... , Under this act, the "personal representative" of the decedent
(spouse, administrator, or executor of the estate) may bring suit for the
beneficiaries (decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent
relative)."
There are several bases upon which a DOHSA suit may lie; these include
negligence, unseaworthiness (in the case of a seaman only), intentional
conduct, and strict or products liability.47 DOHSA preempts state wrongful
death remedies and general maritime law remedies.4' Thus, DOHSA
provides the exclusive remedy for unseaworthiness when a seaman is killed
beyond three nautical miles. 49 DOHSA does not, however, preempt the use
of state survival statutes to supplement the remedies for passengers and other
42 The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (CC Md. 1865) (No. 12,578).
43 The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. at 213.
"See Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Gilmore, (The Hamilton) 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
45 Death on High Seas by Wrongful Act, 46 U.S.C.A. § 761 (1994).
46 THOMAS SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW, 237 (1st ed. 1987).
47 Id.
48 Steven C. Dittman, Admiralty: Conflict of Law on the High Seas-The States and the
Death on the High Seas Act, 59 TuL. L. REV. 1487, 1499 (1985).
49 Id.
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non-seafarers killed on the high seas.5" Such statutes may provide recovery
for losses to the estate of the decedent, including the loss of the decedent's
future earnings."
Recovery under DOHSA is limited to pecuniary damages, which may
include loss of support, loss of the services .of the deceased, loss of nurture,
guidance, care, and instruction, loss of inheritance, and funeral expenses paid
by the dependants. 52  Other "non-pecuniary" damages, such as loss of
consortium and mental anguish of dependents, is not compensable.53 The
Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether state survival
statutes can supplement DOHSA damages, as DOHSA does not include a
survival statute. While DOHSA provided a remedy in times when there was
no general maritime cause of action for wrongful death, the remedy was only
applicable to deaths caused by negligence occurring outside a state's
territorial waters, and therefore left open many holes in the remedial
scheme.'
Also enacted in 1920, the Jones Act extended to seamen the protections
of the Federal Employers' Liability Act,5" which provides a remedy for
wrongful death and a survival action.56 Prior to enactment of the Jones Act,
seamen had no remedy against a shipowner for injuries caused by the
negligence of the ship's officers or crew.57 The personal representative of
the deceased is the appropriate person to bring suit for wrongful death under
the Jones Act, and liability is negligence-based.5"
As with DOHSA claims, damages are limited to pecuniary loss under the
Jones Act.59 Unlike DOHSA, the Jones Act contains a survival provision
under which plaintiffs can recover for conscious pain and suffering of the
decedent before death.6° Furthermore, because the Jones Act and DOHSA
are distinct claims, a seaman's surviving spouse can sue under DOHSA for
50 Joseph D. Jamail, Article: The Damages Award in a Maritime Personal Injury Case,
45 LA. L. REV. 837, 845 (1985).
5, Id. at 847.
32 Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 239.
53 Id.
" Jamail, supra note 50, at 845.
'5 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1994).
' Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 243.
57 Jamail, supra note 50, at 837.
58 Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 243.
9 Id.
60 Jamail, supra note 50, at 846.
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wrongful death based on the vessel's unseaworthiness even if the seaman had
settled his personal injury claim against the vessel before his death resulting
from those same injuries.6 '
In 1927, the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act
(LHWCA) was enacted, providing compensation for the death or disability
of any person engaged in "maritime employment" if the disability or death
resulted from an injury incurred upon the navigable waters of the United
States.62 Under LHWCA, the employer must pay death benefits according
to the statutory scheme: reasonable funeral expenses (not exceeding $3000),
and spouse and dependent benefits. 6' LHWCA also provides for a cause of
action for negligence against a "vessel" that includes a remedy for wrongful
death.' The §905(b) cause of action against the vessel owner is for
negligence in maritime tort. The term "vessel" under LHWCA includes
"said vessel's owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, charter or bare
boat charterer, master, officer, or crew member."'6
A plaintiff may also be able to proceed under the general maritime law if
such a claim is not preempted. In Moragne, the Court created a wrongful
death action for negligence and unseaworthiness under the general maritime
law, overruling The Harrisburg, in which it had held that there was no cause
of action under the general maritime law for wrongful death.66 Subsequent
courts have established that the proper party with standing to sue in such an
action is the decedent's personal representative. 67
The cause of action in Moragne was created because the decedent, a
longshore worker killed in territorial waters, could not recover against the
vessel based on a seaworthiness claim. The Court was seeking once again
to produce uniformity of results in maritime wrongful death actions and to
eliminate the three anomalies previously mentioned."
61 Id.
6 Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 244.
63 Id. at 244-45.
6' Id. at 245.
6' Id. at 218.
66 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 409.
67 See Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1978).
68 Moragne, 398 U.S. at 406-408.
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Under Moragne and subsequently decided cases, damages in a general
maritime law claim were held to include damages typically recoverable under
DOHSA.69 In addition, however, damages may include loss of society,
which encompasses loss of "love, affection, care, attention, companionship,
comfort, and protection," and damages for the decedent's pain and suffering
before death.70 Therefore, recovery for loss of society is the main distin-
guishing characteristic between recovery under general maritime law and
recovery under the other statutory schemes, as the Jones Act and DOHSA
do not provide for the recovery of non-pecuniary damages. 7' Another
difference is the possibility of recovery of punitive damages under general
maritime law.72
In Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, the Supreme Court held that DOHSA
preempts any general maritime law claims for wrongful death where death
occurs beyond a marine league." As a result of this decision, the Moragne
cause of action was relegated to navigable waters and territorial waters
within the area of state jurisdiction.74 In addition, the 1972 amendments to
the LHWCA, which eliminated a longshoreman's remedy for unseaworthi-
ness based on strict liability as established in Sieracki, provided for a
statutory cause of action for suits against a vessel based on negligence.7"
In the wake of Moragne, the general maritime remedy for wrongful death
appeared open to representatives of seamen accidentally killed within three
nautical miles who sue for unseaworthiness, and persons, including
passengers and visitors aboard ships and aircraft, killed within three miles in
admiralty jurisdiction, who sue for negligence.76 Furthermore, the general
maritime law of wrongful death was said to be exclusive where it applied.77
69 See Complaint of Cambria S.S. Co., 505 F.2d 517 (6th Cir. 1974); Thompson v.
Offshore Co., 440 F. Supp. 752 (S.D. Tex. 1977).
7' Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 241.
71 Id. But see Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1990) (damages recoverable in
a general maritime cause of action for the wrongful death of a seaman do not include loss of
society).
72 Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 241.
73 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
7" Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 242.
7 Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 901 (1995).
76 Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 242.
' See Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980) (Moragne remedy precludes
recognition in admiralty of state wrongful death statutes).
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Several cases subsequently displaced state wrongful death statutes in favor
of the general maritime law remedy in cases of wrongful death of nonseafar-
ers.78 This trend was to be reversed by Yamaha.
Ill. ANALYSIS
In Yamaha the Court held that "[iln maritime wrongful death cases in
which no federal statute specifies the appropriate relief and the decedent was
not a seaman, longshore worker, or person otherwise engaged in a maritime
trade, state remedies remain applicable and have not been displaced by the
wrongful death action recognized in Moragne."79  The Court explicitly
rejected the argument that the Moragne general maritime remedy for
wrongful death applied in all cases of deaths occurring in state territorial
waters. s0
The Court's decision makes sense for several reasons. First of all, there
is no federal common law or statutory rule which explicitly prohibits the
application of state common law remedies to cases of wrongful death of
nonseafarers not covered by the other statutory schemes."1 As previously
discussed, the Jones Act applies only to seamen, the LHWCA applies only
to "maritime workers" and the DOHSA, while applying to nonseafarers, only
applies on the high seas and not to deaths occurring in territorial waters.
Furthermore, no Supreme Court cases have explicitly held that Moragne
should displace all state law wrongful death remedies.8 2 Such a result
would ignore the fecund case law awarding state law remedies after
Harrisburg. The Supreme Court recognized in Yamaha that wrongful death
statutes proved "an adequate supplement to federal maritime law. 8 3
With respect to wrongful death actions, the case has often been made that
Moragne and the frequently recurring theme of harmonization and uniformity
78 See Wahlstrom v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 4 F.3d 1084 (2d Cir. 1993); Neal v.
Barisich, 707 F. Supp. 862 (E.D. La 1989); Thurmond v. Delta Well Surveyors, 836 F.2d 952
(5th Cir. 1988); Nelson v. United States, 639 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1980), In re S/S Helena, 529
F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81 (D. Conn. 1993).
79 Yamaha, 1996 LEXIS 463, at 19.
' Id. at 625.
8" Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 40 F.3d 622, U.S.L.W. Daily (Nov. 11, 1994) (No.
93-1736).
82 New Jersey Law Journal (American Lawyer Newspapers Group, Inc.), Nov. 21, 1994,
at 63.
83 Yamaha, 1996 US LEXIS 463, at 17.
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of maritime law call for a displacement of state law in favor of a federal
wrongful death remedy that applies evenly to all deaths in territorial waters
not covered by statute. Such arguments often turn on the theory that,
because DOHSA and the Jones Act preempt state wrongful death statutes,
Moragne should do the same.8
Moragne is not, however, a statutory scheme with clearly defined
procedures and remedies. The Court in Moragne refrained from addressing
subsidiary issues relating to the new cause of action, relegating the final
resolution of such questions to the lower courts in future litigation. 5 As the
Court recognized in Yamaha, there is no cause for enlargement of the
damages statutorily protected where Congress has prescribed a comprehen-
sive tort system.' No such system is available for victims such as Natalie
Calhoun.
Although cases have attempted to define the extent and contours of the
remedy, such ad hoc definition of the remedy's parameters seems only to
have countered the original purpose espoused in Moragne. It only seems
reasonable that gaps left by the Moragne decision be filled by state remedial
schemes, as had been the case after The Harrisburg. There is no federal
substantive policy with which state wrongful death or survival statutes
conflict in this case. 7 In the absence of clear conflict, the traditional
admiralty choice of law test dictates that state law rules of decision apply.88
The courts should be permitted to draw on state law to fill a void the
legislature has yet to fill.
Again, case law prior to Moragne allowed for the application of state
wrongful death actions, and Moragne did not explicitly reject this practice.
The purpose of the Moragne remedy was motivated by a "humane and
liberal" desire to assure that survivors of seamen killed in state territorial
waters should not be barred a remedy simply because the tort system of the
particular state in which a seaman died did not incorporate special maritime
doctrines.8 9 The Court was attempting only to compensate for the increase
in unseaworthiness claims based on strict liability and negligence-based state
wrongful death statutes.'
u See supra note 81.
Moragne, 398 U.S. at 408.
8 Yamaha, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 463, at 31.
8 See supra note 82.
AId.
s Yamaha, 1996 U.S. LEXIS 463, at 28.
'0Id. at 18.
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Such an overarching goal does not justify or explain any desire to preclude
nonseafarers who do not have access to a statutory scheme from taking
advantage of a state statute. In fashioning its remedy in Moragne, it is
doubtful that the Court intended to protect seamen at the expense of
nonseafarers whose remedies would be dismal compared to damages
recoverable had their death occurred on land. The death of a recreational
boater is not so uniquely maritime in character that the courts should be
prevented from applying traditional common law tort recovery. Such an
application of federal substantive admiralty law would be both illogical and
inequitable.
One must not, however, discount the process advocated in Moragne of
achieving uniformity of maritime law by looking to statutes for guidance in
developing remedies. The result of Yamaha, one could argue, may be that
fifty different bodies of state law are now competing with federal maritime
law.
Such a principle does not, when taken to its logical conclusion, justify a
displacement of state law remedies. In Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallenti-
re,9 the Supreme Court held that DOHSA, the only federal statute applica-
ble to non-seamen, displaced the state wrongful death statute for deaths on
the high seas.' The Court explained, however, that DOHSA was intended
to preserve state wrongful death remedies for survivors of people killed in
territorial waters. The Court has never held that state remedies should not
be preserved when dealing with state territorial waters. Furthermore, nothing
in DOHSA explicitly precludes the application of state remedies in territorial
waters.
If Moragne were to have incorporated DOHSA provisions into its newly-
created causes of action, thereby displacing state law remedies, it would have
given effect to DOHSA in an area in which it was not intended to apply,
thereby transforming the statute without Congressional action.
It has long been held that state law need not always be displaced by
substantive admiralty law.93 Because of a lack of conflict between admiralty
law and state law, and because of the post Harrisburg practice of allowing
state wrongful death remedies, Moragne should not be said to displace state
wrongful death remedies for deaths of non-seamen in territorial waters.
Furthermore, because neither Congress nor the Court has explicitly precluded
"' Offshore Logistics Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986).92 1d.
13 Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1043 (1995).
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the operation of state wrongful death statutes in these cases, Yamaha appears
a well-reasoned answer to the lingering question relating to the application
of the cause of action it created nearly three decades ago. It should be added
that, despite its significant impact, Yamaha is relatively limited in scope,
applying only to the deaths of non-seafarers in territorial waters. The
intrusion on general maritime law would thus appear to be slight.
Yamaha can also be seen as part of a general trend in which state law has
been allowed in admiralty. Most notably, the Supreme Court recently held
that in admiralty cases filed in state court under the Jones Act and the
"saving to suitors clause,"" federal law does not pre-empt state law
regarding the doctrine of forum non conveniens." Similarly, in Linton v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., the Fifth Circuit held that "a non-jury trial
in state court is not, in and of itself, offensive to the general maritime law
... a maritime non-jury action is not necessarily outside the 'saving to
suitors' clause and within the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction of the federal
courts."" These cases are examples of what appears to be a growing
judicial tolerance of state law in the admiralty context.
The Supreme Court has thus finally answered a question that has plagued
admiralty law for nearly two decades. In reversing the long-standing trend
of displacing state tort law remedies in favor of the "federal maritime cause
of action" espoused in Moragne, the Court has not only reinforced the
principle of expansion of remedies as espoused in that case, but it has set
forth a rule upon which potential plaintiffs can rely when bringing suit for
wrongful death occurring in territorial waters. The Court's decision takes
little away from the "uniformity principle" long valued in admiralty law but
has provided the families of those killed in territorial waters with a remedy
more in conformity with modem times.
9 "Section 1333(1) of Title 28 of the USC ... gives federal district courts 'original
jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States,' of admiralty and maritime cases, 'saving
to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise entitled.' Despite the
apparent grant of exclusive federal jurisdiction, the 'savings clause' is interpreted to reserve
to suitors the right of a common law remedy 'in all cases where the common law is
competent to give it.' " Schoenbaum, supra note 46, at 116.
" American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 114 S. Ct. 981 (1994).
96 Linton v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 964 F.2d 1480, 1487 (5th Cir. 1992).
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